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CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL 
VOTING: A SIMULTANEOUS PROBIT-TOBIT MODEL 
Henry W. Chappell, Jr.* 
I. Introduction 
M /[ ANY citizens and scholars have been 
troubled by the influence that special 
interest groups appear to exert over policymak- 
ing as a result of their roles in the financing of 
political campaigns. These concerns inspired the 
enactment of a number of election law reforms in 
the 1970s, and have led to increasing popular 
support for public financing of electoral cam- 
paigns. Despite the public attention these issues 
have attracted, few social scientists have at- 
tempted to analyze the financial relationships be- 
tween interest groups and policymakers empiri- 
cally.1 One such study was reported by Durden 
and Silberman (1976), who included contribu- 
tions from the AFL-CIO political action commit- 
tee as an independent variable in an equation 
explaining congressional voting on minimum 
wage legislation. Their results indicated that 
campaign contributions ignificantly affected vot- 
ing on that issue. The work I have done differs 
substantially from that of Durden and Silberman 
in two ways. First, I have chosen to examine 
issues which were of considerably narrower con- 
cern than the minimum wage issue. In the interest 
of simplicity, I examine issues of concern to just 
one or a few groups. I have also used a different 
econometric technique. If campaign contribu- 
tions are actually endogenous (as seems plausi- 
ble), the single equation estimation technique 
employed by Durden and Silberman is subject to 
a possible simultaneous equations bias. For each 
issue studied, I have therefore jointly estimated a 
two equation system explaining both votes on the 
bill and contributions from an associated interest 
group. The "'simultaneous probit-Tobit" model 
which I use takes into account the dichotomous 
nature of the variable indicating a congressman's 
vote, the non-negativity constraint imposed on 
the contribution variable, and the possibility of 
correlation between the error terms for the equa- 
tions explaining these two variables.2 Full-infor- 
mation maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates 
for the model are consistent and asymptotically 
efficient. 
II. The Model 
In the analysis of voting on a particular issue, 
the principal economic agents of concern are 
congressmen and a single interest group.3 Con- 
gressmen's voting decisions are presumed to be 
motivated by a desire to be reelected, while the 
interest group is assumed to allocate campaign 
funds to various candidates in an attempt to 
influence the legislative outcome of the issue. In 
(1)-(5) below, I hypothesize a "simultaneous 
probit-Tobit" model (hence referred to as model 
SPT) to explain voting decisions made by con- 
gressmen and contribution decisions made by the 
interest group: 
Yli = Yw2i + /31X1V - ( 1i (1) 
Y2 =82X2i - (T2V2i (2) 
wi= i if Yzi 
> 0 (3) 
W2i= Y2i if Y2i >0 (4) I OifY2i -< 0 
Received for publication December 29, 1980. Revision ac- 
cepted for publication May 27, 1981. 
* University of South Carolina. 
This paper is based on my Ph.D. dissertation in economics. 
I wish to acknowledge the valuable suggestions of my ad- 
visors, Susan Rose-Ackerman and Ray C. Fair. Comments 
from an anonymous referee have improved the exposition of 
several points. 
I A number of previous econometric works have dealt with 
various aspects of campaign finance or roll-call voting. See, 
for example, Jackson (1974), Welch (1974, 1980). Palda 
(1975), Durden and Silberman (1976), Jacobson (1978), 
Abrams (1977), Danielson and Rubin (1977), and Kau and 
Rubin (1979). Only the article by Durden and Silberman 
examines the connection between funding and subsequent 
voting. In recent works, Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1979) and 
Welch (forthcoming) have independently undertaken studies 
of contributions and voting, but they have employed econo- 
metric approaches which differ from the simultaneous equa- 
tions model developed here. 
2 The model I use belongs to the general class of models 
described by Heckman (1976, 1978); however, the specific 
model I use has not been previously estimated. Some related 
models are discussed in Chappell (1981). 
3 A more detailed formal presentation of the theory is pro- 
vided in Chappell (1979), which is based in part on the work 
of Rose-Ackerman (1978). 
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E(vji) = 0; E(vji2) = 1; E(VliV2i) =P; 
E(vjivj,i,) = O; for j,j' = 1, 2; 
i,i'= 1,...,n;i j (5) 
where 
Yli = a latent variable indicating the pro- 
pensity of a congressman to vote in 
favor of the interest group position; 
w1i = a dummy variable equal to 1 to indi- 
cate a "yes" vote (i.e., in favor of the 
interest group's favored alternative), 
and equal to 0 for a "no" vote; 
Y2i = a latent variable indicating the pro- 
pensity of the interest group to contrib- 
ute to congressman i; 
W2i = the actual contribution from the inter- 
est group to congressman i; 
X1j is a vector of variables indicating con- 
stituency characteristics and the fixed 
attributes of congressman i; 
X2, is a vector of variables indicating the 
legislative power of congressman i if 
he is elected, his probability of elec- 
tion, and his initial position on the is- 
sue; 
13i, /32 are vectors of coefficients; 
o2, y are scalar coefficients; 
v1, v2 are random error terms. 
It is assumed that v1j and v2j have a bivariate 
normal distribution with correlation coefficient p, 
and that restrictions sufficient o identify equa- 
tion (1) are imposed. 
The probit equation, (1), is hypothesized to 
explain votes on the issue.4 According to the 
model, a "yes" vote occurs when the unob- 
served latent variable y1i exceeds a threshold 
level of zero, and a "no" vote occurs otherwise. 
This unobserved variable can be interpreted as 
the candidate's "propensity to vote in favor of 
the interest group." 
Equation (1) indicates that the propensity to 
favor the interest group is a function of contribu- 
tions from the interest group and a vector of 
exogenous variables. It is useful to imagine that 
the exogenous variables determine an "initial 
position" on the issue for a candidate, and that 
contributions cause shifts away from that posi- 
tion. The theoretical motivation for this formula- 
tion is straightforward. To increase his chances 
of election, a candidate will attempt to reflect the 
interests of constituents in his policy positions; 
thus constituent characteristics are included in 
the vector X~1. In a political world characterized 
by imperfect knowledge, he need not reflect 
those preferences perfectly to avoid certain elec- 
toral loss, however. Personal ideological prefer- 
ences and party planks (also included in X1j) will 
affect his voting as well. Imperfect voter knowl- 
edge also allows campaign spending to aid in 
securing votes, so a congressman might be will- 
ing to alter his advocated policy somewhat if a 
campaign contribution were offered as an in- 
ducement. Voting could also be affected by 
contributions in more subtle ways. Alexander 
(1972), for example, has argued that contribu- 
tions might induce a sympathetic response in a 
congressman which may not even be apparent to 
the recipient himself, and Welch (forthcoming) 
has likened the contribution-voting relationship 
to the reciprocal giving of Christmas gifts. The 
formulation of equation (1) is consistent with 
candidate responses to contributions which re- 
flect tradeoffs to increase chances of election, as 
well as those which reflect induced sympathy for 
one's supporters. 
Interest group contributions are explained by 
the Tobit equation, (2).5 Positive contributions 
are observed when an unobserved "propensity 
to contribute to a candidate," Y2i, exceeds 0. 
When the propensity to contribute is positive, 
actual contributions equal the propensity to con- 
tribute; when the propensity to contribute is 
negative, a zero contribution is observed. 
An important assumption about the interest 
group6 underlies the specification of the equation 
4 Problems encountered in using the linear probability 
model when the dependent variable is dichotomous are well 
known: predicted values of the dependent variable are not 
limited to the 0 to I interval, and the errors are heteroscedas- 
tic and non-normal. Johnson (1972) has discussed the single 
equation probit model. 
5 The simple linear model would also be inappropriate for 
an equation to explain contributions. Observed contributions 
are always greater than or equal to zero, but predicted values 
of contributions obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates can be negative. Since more than half of the ob- 
served contributions equal zero for each of the issues studied, 
failure to impose the non-negativity constraint on predicted 
contributions could imply a serious misspecification of the 
model. See Tobin (1958) for a discussion of the single equa- 
tion Tobit model. 
6 By assuming just one interest group, I rule out complica- 
tions which would arise if several groups were competing to 
achieve different outcomes. 
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to explain contributions. I assume that in at- 
tempting to secure favorable policy by making 
contributions, the interest group regards candi- 
dates' probabilities of election as fixed. Both in- 
tuition and some empirical evidence suggest that 
this assumption is a good approximation of real- 
ity. Although aggregate candidate expenditures 
may have some effect on election chances, a 
contribution from any particular group will prob- 
ably have negligible impact.7 Given that the 
group regards election probabilities as fixed, its 
motive for contributing must be to alter candi- 
date policies via their reactions as specified in 
equation (1).8 (Welch (1974) has referred to this 
aim as the "quid pro quo" motive.) Contribu- 
tions should therefore be targeted at powerful 
congressmen (e.g., veteran members of impor- 
tant committees) and at likely winners (e.g., in- 
cumbents). Influencing a candidate will be of lit- 
tle benefit if he has poor chances of gaining a seat 
in the legislature, or if he has no political clout 
once elected. The nature of majority voting pro- 
cesses also encourages contributors to try to 
build winning sized coalitions. Since coalitions 
are more easily built around a nucleus of support- 
ers, we expect to see more contributions given 
to those with some initial tendency to favor the 
interest group rather than to those strongly in- 
clined to oppose them. Thus contributions will be 
a function of X2i, a vector of variables indicating 
the legislative power of candidate i conditional 
upon his election, his probability of election, and 
his initial position on the issue of concern. In the 
following empirical analysis, the variables in X1i 
are employed as indicators of a congressman's 
initial position, thus X1,i s a subset of X2i. 
Model SPT differs from standard probit and 
Tobit models only by permitting a non-zero cor- 
relation coefficient for the error terms of the 
equations. So long as p = 0, single equation tech- 
niques could be used to estimate both equations 
(1) and (2) consistently. If p $ 0, however, the 
error term v1i will generally be correlated with 
the endogenous explanatory variable w2i in equa- 
tion (1). When an explanatory variable is corre- 
lated with the error term, the single equation 
probit estimator is subject to a bias similar to that 
arising in OLS estimation of a linear model under 
similar circumstances (see Olsen, 1975). This 
bias could result in very misleading conclusions. 
For example, suppose we analyze voting on ap- 
propriations for the B-I bomber, but no measure 
of "hawkishness" is included as an exogenous 
variable in either equation (1) or (2). If Rockwell 
International (the prime contractor for the air- 
craft) contributed only to "hawks," hoping to 
ensure their election, and if these hawks later 
voted in favor of the B-1 bomber because they 
vote in favor of all military spending, then a 
correlation between contributions and votes 
would result. The relationship would not be 
causal, however, and reported significance of the 
contribution coefficient would be attributable to 
the correlation of error terms resulting from the 
omission of a variable. Use of a simultaneous 
equations estimator is therefore appropriate. 
FIML estimates can be obtained for all param- 
eters of model SPT, including the correlation 
coefficient p. These estimates are consistent and 
asymptotically efficient, and therefore avoid the 
problems inherent with the single equation probit 
estimators. A brief discussion of computational 
matters is presented in an appendix which is 
available from the author upon request. 
The proposed model is necessarily a simplifica- 
tion of the real politico-economic world, and 
brief mention should be made of several impor- 
tant real world complications. We have assumed 
that congressmen's votes are independent of 
each other, yet in the real world interdependence 
may result from logrolling or from the emulation 
of leaders. The model also supposes that interest 
groups are rewarded for contributing, but it 
makes no provision for punishment of those who 
contribute to a congressman's enemies. In addi- 
tion, candidates and interest groups may interact 
through channels which the model does not con- 
sider: an interest group may contribute by offer- 
ing an illegal bribe or an in-kind contribution of 
labor; congressmen can respond via committee 
activities. Contributor motives may also be more 
complex. Contributions might be used to estab- 
lish a reward structure which serves as a means 
of communication about the kind of behavior 
7 The econometric results of Jacobson (1978) show that 
even aggregate expenditures by incumbents (who make up a 
large proportion of the sample I use) have little or no effect on 
the percentage of votes won. 
8 Based on an econometric investigation, Welch (1980, p. 
115) concluded that "an interest group contributes in order to 
obtain political favors, not to affect electoral outcomes." 
This is not inconsistent with the earlier assertion that politi- 
cians may desire contributions to further their election aims, 
since politicians may be considering the aggregate effects of 
all of their contributions. 
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expected of recipients, or interest groups might 
give to friendly candidates in hopes that their 
campaigning will sway voter opinion in favor of 
the group. Perhaps more importantly, the model 
has assumed that the contribution decision is a 
unilateral one, made by the contributor alone. I 
have not accounted for endogenous candidate 
solicitation efforts, or for the possibility that 
candidates can turn down offered contributions. 
Despite these deficiencies, the model does pro- 
vide a reasonable framework for analyzing voting 
decisions, and similar models have had some 
success in explaining congressional voting. De- 
velopment of models incorporating more real 
world features provides a task for future re- 
search. 
III. The Empirical Study 
The preceding theoretical discussion provides 
a basis for the empirical analysis of interest group 
campaign contributions and roll call voting by 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
in the 1974-1977 period. Several criteria were 
used to guide the selection of the seven issues 
analyzed in the study. First, an effort was made 
to avoid issues of concern to numerous diverse 
and competing interest groups. Ideally, just one 
group should be associated with each issue. Is- 
sues in regulatory policy often conform to this 
criterion reasonably well, since a regulated in- 
dustry usually provides a unified interest, and 
their opponents are diffuse and unorganized. I 
have also attempted to select issues for which 
close votes were recorded in the House, since 
congressmen may behave differently in their de- 
cision-making when voting on issues of certain 
versus those of doubtful outcomes. Issues for 
which a congressman must seriously consider the 
possibility that his vote could influence the ulti- 
mate outcome of legislation are preferred. Fi- 
nally, it was also necessary to choose issues for 
which an associated interest group made sub- 
stantial contributions. 
The seven issues chosen for study include 
mortgage disclosure requirements for lenders, 
milk price supports, truck weight limits, tax re- 
bates for oil companies, funding for the B-1 
bomber, auto emissions controls, and a maritime 
cargo preference bill. The first hree issues were 
voted on in 1975 and have been analyzed in con- 
junction with contribution data from the 1974 
election, while the remaining four issues were 
voted on in 1977 and have been used with con- 
tribution data from the 1976 election. Table 1 
briefly describes the legislative content of the 
seven issues, lists associated campaign con- 
tributors and their preferred policies, and indi- 
cates what variables are employed in the empiri- 
cal study to represent constituent preferences on 
the bill. It also reports some summary statistics, 
including the number of congressmen in the sam- 
ple receiving contributions from each group, and 
the aggregate value of those contributions. The 
number of congressmen for and against the inter- 
est group' s favored alternative are also listed, as 
is the simple correlation coefficient between 
group contributions to individual congressmen 
and the dummy variable indicating a con- 
gressman's vote. In all cases the vote variable is 
defined so that votes favoring the interest group 
are assigned a value of one, thus positive correla- 
tions were anticipated. The table shows that for 
all eight contributors, contributions and asso- 
ciated votes were positively correlated. 
The selection of explanatory variables to be 
included in the empirical analysis was guided by 
the discussion in section II. For an equation ex- 
plaining votes on a given issue, the explanatory 
variables included contributions from the asso- 
ciated interest group, a dummy variable to indi- 
cate party affiliation, and an ideological rating, 
ACA. ACA is a conservative rating computed by 
the Americans for Constitutional Action, and 
was included not only as an indicator of a con- 
gressman's personal ideological bent, but also as 
a measure of constituency preferences (since 
conservative constituents do tend to elect con- 
servative representatives). In addition, other 
variables appropriate to specific issues were in- 
cluded, when available, as indicators of constitu- 
ent preferences (see table 1).9 For equations ex- 
plaining contributions from interest groups, 
explanatory variables included dummy variables 
for relevant committee memberships (as indi- 
9 A detailed list of variable definitions is available from the 
author upon request. Sources of data include The Almanac of 
American Politics, Common Cause's 1974 Congressional 
Campaign Finances and 1976 Federal Campaign Finances, 
The Congressional District Data Book, Congressional Quar- 
terlv Almanac, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review, 
1976 House of Representativbes Receipts and Expenditures 
(Federal Elections Commission), Vessel Entrances and 
Clearances (Bureau of the Census), and the Basic Petroleum 
Data Book (American Petroleum Institute). 
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TABLE 1.-SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Vote- 
Interest Contribution 
Interest Group Group Correlation Indicators of Constituent 
Issue/Sample' Effect of Proposal Contributions Position Coefficient Preferences 
1. Red-lining Disclosure Would ease proposed American Banking Association: Favored .0748 Urban population percentage 
Amendment requirements for detailed $40,550 to 48 Congressmen 
House Vote 487, 1975 reporting of the geographic 
Sample Size: 328 distribution of mortgage loans. 
Favoring Group: 164 
Opposing Group: 164 
2. Milk Price Supports Would reduce the proposed Associated Milk Producers, Opposed .1873 Dummy variable indicating 
House Vote 45, 1975 milk price support level from Dairymen Incorporated: dairy farming importance in 
Sample Size: 417 851'X to 804c of parity. 9124,585 to 58 Congressmen a district: 
Favoring Group: 196 Rural farm population 
Opposing Group: 221 percentage 
3. Truck Weight Limits Would roll back maximum American Trucking Opposed .1604 
House Vote 600, 1975 truck weights allowed on Association: $79,500to 131 
Sample Size: 412 interstate highways from 80,000 Congressmen: 
Favoring Groups: 276 lb. to 73.289 lb. Teamsters: $79,834 to 90 Opposed .0255 
Opposing Groups: 136 Congressmen 
4. Cargo Preference Bill Would require 9.5(' of Amer- Maritime Unions: 5358,004 to Favored .3737 Per capita tons entering ports 
House Vote 618, 1977 ica's oil imports to be shipped 164 Congressmen in a congressman's state 
Sample Size: 420 in U.S. built and operated 
Favoring Group: 164 ships. 
Opposing Group: 256 
5. Crude Oil Tax Rebate Would return part of the Major Oil Companies: 5159,232 Favored .4393 Per capita oil production in 
House Vote 474, 1977 revenues from the proposed to 190 Congressmen a congressman's state 
Favoring Group: 197 crude oil equalization tax to 
Opposing Group: 222 producers who make additional 
investments in oil exploration. 
6. Auto Emissions Standards Would impose stricter National Automobile Dealers Opposed .2523 Dummy variable indicating 
House Vote 266, 1977 emissions standards for Association: $192,250 to 187 automobile manufacturing 
Sample Size: 389 automobiles. Congressmen importance in a district 
Favoring Group: 202 
Opposing Group: 187 
7. B-I Bomber Appropriation Would delete funding for Rockwell International Opposed .1840 
House Vote 484, 1977 production of 5 B-I bombers. Corporation: $7,800 to 35 
Sample Size: 419 Congressmen 
Favoring Group: 207 
Opposing Group: 212 
The sample for each issue consists of all congressmen voting on the issue, with the exception of those appointed to fill vacancies occurring since the previous 
election. 
cators of power), a dummy variable for incum- 
bency (to indicate likelihood of election), the 
candidate' s vote percentage in the preceding 
election (also an indicator of likelihood of elec- 
tion),10 and exogenous variables from the equa- 
tion explaining votes to serve as proxies for a 
candidate's initial position. 
For each issue, model SPT was estimated by 
two techniques. First, under the assumption that 
p = 0, single equation probit and Tobit es- 
timators were employed. The more general 
model, which allows p to take non-zero values, 
was then estimated by the FIML method. For the 
truck weight limits issue it was necessary to es- 
timate the model twice, once considering only 
American Trucking Association contributions, 
and once considering only Teamster contribu- 
tions. Separate analysis of the two groups was re- 
quired since my program to compute FIML esti- 
mates of model SPT is limited to two equation 
systems. 
Space limitations preclude the reporting of 
complete results here,'1 so I will first summarize 
those findings which are similar according to the 
two techniques, and then turn to a discussion of 
the estimated effects of contributions, which are 
reported in table 2. 
In the probit equations explaining voting, the 
results consistently showed that ideology, party 
affiliation, and indicators of constituent interests 
are important determinants of congressmen's 
voting decisions. According to both single equa- 
tion and simultaneous equation estimates, the 
coefficient of ACA, the ideological rating, was 
significant at the 1% level for 6 of 7 issues, and 
the coefficient of PARTY, a dummy variable in- 
10 If the candidate's vote percentage is actually endoge- 
nous, contrary to the assumption of the model, further econo- 
metric difficulties arise. In addition to the obvious simul- 
taneity problem, estimates reported here would be subject to 
a selectivity bias, since only winning candidates (i.e., those 
with a vote percentage above 50%) are included in the sam- 
ple. 
11 Complete results are available from the author upon 
request. 
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TABLE 2.-ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION COEFFICIENTS AND ERROR TERM CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS IN EQUATIONS TO 
EXPLAIN VOTING 
(asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses) 
Single Equation FIML Error Term 
Issue/Group Probit Probit Correlation Coefficient 
1. Red-lining Disclosure 0.2739 0.1783 0.0669 
American Banking Association (0.7912) (0.3148) (0.2186) 
2. Milk Prices 0.2416 0.0635 0.3231 
Dairy Groups (2.3428)b (0.5868) (2.1665)b 
3. Truck Weight Limits 0.4558 0.0192 0.2874 
Trucking Association (2.3428)b (0.0654) (2.0264)b 
4. Truck Weight Limits 0.2572 0.1902 0.0538 
Teamsters (1.6168) (0.5977) (0.2742) 
5. Crude Oil Tax Rebate 0.2822 -0.2906 0.4080 
Oil Companies (1.6994)c (-0.8027) (1.8318)c 
6. Auto Emissions Standards 0.3309 -0.1814 0.4965 
National Automobile Dealers Assoc. (3.1053)a (-0.9623) (3.5425)a 
7. B-i Bomber Appropriation 6.2879 7.9520 -0.1852 
Rockwell International (3.7243)a (1. 8735)C (-0.4398) 
8. Cargo Preference Bill 0.3920 1.578 0.3447 
Maritime Unions (5.1031)a (1.1375) (2.1379)b 
aSignificant at the 1% level. 
bSignificant at the 5% level. 
'Significant at the 10% level. 
dicating a Democrat, was significant at the 1% 
level for 5 of 7 issues. All coefficients of variables 
included to represent constituent preferences in 
the voting equations were significant at the 10% 
level or higher, and expected sign patterns pre- 
vailed. 
Estimates for the Tobit equations explaining 
contributions were also quite similar for the two 
estimation techniques. Since the single equation 
Tobit estimates are consistent, this is not surpris- 
ing. The contribution equations showed that, as 
anticipated, contributions were targeted primar- 
ily at incumbents, especially those who were 
members of important committees. For 6 of the 8 
contributing roups studied, the coefficient for the 
dummy indicating an incumbent was positive and 
significant at the 10% level or higher. With the 
exception of the Teamsters, each contributing 
group gave significantly higher contributions to 
members of a related committee. The results also 
showed that contributors gave less to candidates 
who were elected by larger margins in the elec- 
tion. Although the theoretical discussion hypoth- 
esized that contributions would be aimed at 
likely winners, an explanation for this result can 
be offered. It is plausible that many candidates 
who are very likely to win simply do not solicit or 
accept contributions. The negative sign for the 
coefficient of the congressman' s vote percentage 
may occur because vote percentage is correlated 
with candidate decisions not to campaign exten- 
sively. In the simple two-equation model of this 
paper, I have not taken account of the possible 
importance of candidate solicitation efforts. (Fu- 
ture work might usefully attempt to incorporate 
effort of solicitation into a model similar to this 
one.) The results also showed some tendency for 
groups to give along ideological lines. Business 
groups most often gave to conservatives, while 
labor groups gave to liberals. Contributions did 
not follow party lines very strictly, however. A 
number of business groups (including the bank- 
ing association, the trucking association, and au- 
tomobile dealers) joined with labor groups to 
give more contributions to Democrats. The latter 
finding lends credence to the 'quid pro quo" 
hypothesis, since Democrats were probably con- 
sidered more powerful by virtue of their majority 
party status. In addition, interest groups gave 
heavily to congressmen initially predisposed to 
vote in their favor. Dairy contributors gave to 
those from farming districts, oil companies gave 
to those from oil producing states, and maritime 
unions gave to those with ports in their districts. 
These findings uggest that the desire to maintain 
a systematic reward structure, or to communi- 
cate with the public by means of candidates' 
campaigning, may be important interest group 
motives. 
Table 2 provides estimates of y (the coefficient 
of contributions in the equation explaining votes) 
and p (the error term correlation coefficient) for 
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each issue. It is apparent that the estimated ef- 
fects of contributions on voting differ substan- 
tially for the two estimation techniques. Accord- 
ing to the single equation probit estimates, con- 
tributions had positive coefficients for each of the 
eight contributors analyzed, and six of the 
coefficients were significant at the 10% level. The 
FIML estimates of model SPT indicate much less 
substantial effects of contributions; only one 
contribution coefficient (that of Rockwell Inter- 
national contributions in the B-i bomber voting 
equation) retains a significant coefficient. In the 
voting equations for all other issues, estimated 
contribution coefficients were smaller than their 
single equation counterparts (two even had nega- 
tive signs) and the estimated error term correla- 
tion coefficient was positive. The positive corre- 
lation between the error terms indicates that 
campaign contributions are likely to go to candi- 
dates who are likely to vote favorably on the 
relevant issue; hence single equation estimates of 
y are biased upwards. In five cases, a t-test at the 
10% significance level indicates that the hypothe- 
sis of zero correlation can be rejected, so it ap- 
pears that the use of the more general simulta- 
neous model is appropriate. 
IV. Conclusions 
FIML estimates of the simultaneous probit- 
Tobit model suggest that the effects of campaign 
contributions on voting are smaller than single 
equation probit estimates would indicate. We are 
generally unable to conclude that contributions 
have a significant impact on voting decisions; 
apparently votes are most often decided on the 
basis of personal ideology or the preferences of 
constituents. These findings differ markedly from 
the earlier results of Durden and Silberman, whose 
single equation models showed a substantial im- 
pact of contributions on voting decisions. 
Despite the lack of significance according to 
model SPT, it would not, however, be appropri- 
ate to unambiguously conclude that contribu- 
tions have no effects on voting. For six of eight 
coefficients the anticipated positive sign resulted, 
and one coefficient remained marginally sig- 
nificant. Inspection of table 2 also shows that the 
lack of significance is attributable not only to 
smaller coefficient size, but also to larger stan- 
dard errors. The FIML estimates of the contribu- 
tion coefficients are not very precise. It is proba- 
ble that rather poor overall explanatory power in 
the equations explaining contributions leads to 
imprecision of these estimates in the voting equa- 
tion. If better models to explain contributions are 
developed in the future, this might result in 
greater precision in estimating the effects of con- 
tributions on voting. 
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